Dimitris Stamatopoulos

The Eastern Question or Balkan Nationalism(s)

Balkan History Reconsidered

Vienna University Press

V&R

Gunnar Hering Lectures

Volume 1

Edited by
Maria A. Stassinopoulou

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Gunnar Hering Lectures
General Editor's Introduction

It is with great pleasure that I write the general editor's introduction to the first volume in the short monograph series Gunnar Hering Lectures. The books are based on yearly lectures that take place in spring at the Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of the University of Vienna. Both the lectures program and the book series are named after the first professor of the Chair of Modern Greek Studies founded in 1982, Gunnar Hering (Dresden 1934–Vienna 1994), a scholar of general and East European history and a specialist in Early Modern and Modern history of the Balkans, in particular of Greece and Bulgaria.

The speakers of the lecture program are encouraged to plan their talk having in mind one of the central characteristics of Modern Greek Studies in Vienna both in teaching and research, as established by Hering and practiced to this day. That is, the talks should not be confined to the borders of Area Studies but rather should be strongly embedded in the wider geographical and conceptual framework of historical thought on Europe and even in the global dimension. We also invite our guests to spend a week at the Special Library of the Department, which houses one of the most substantial collections of books and other media on Modern Greece, and to work in the renowned research landscape of Vienna with its particular relevance to South Eastern Europe. The lectures program was initiated by Dimitris Kousouris and Maria A. Stassinopoulou in 2016. It has been

made possible through the welcoming and positive resonance among our colleagues both at the University of Vienna and internationally and the financial support of the Faculty of Historical and Cultural Studies of the University of Vienna and the City of Vienna and its Department for Cultural Affairs (MA 7), to whom we express our most sincere appreciation.

The first book is devoted, as was the initial lecture, to a subject central to Hering's own research: comparative political history of South Eastern Europe. Dimitris Stamatopoulos, professor of Balkan and Late Ottoman History at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, gladly accepted our invitation to be the first speaker and then the first author of the series. He chose as his topic nationalisms and revolutions, a subject which Hering also researched, in particular political parties and nation-building in the emerging states of the area in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Olga Katsiardi-Hering was the respondent for this first lecture; once more we would like to express our gratitude for her enthusiastic reaction to our project and her lively and rich participation during the lecture and beyond.

Vienna University Press V&R welcomed the proposition to publish the lectures in this format. Thanks are due to the Vienna University Press V&R committee of the University of Vienna, who accepted the new series in their program and to Oliver Kätsch, who helped us through the early steps from first idea to realization. Stephen Cashmore cast his expert proof-reading eye over the text, and Anke Moseberg applied her talents to the layout and printing.

As the general editor of the series I am indebted to them all.

Maria A. Stassinopoulou
Vienna, May 2018

Preface of the author

This essay is based on a lecture presented in 2016 at the University of Vienna to inaugurate a series of yearly lectures dedicated to Gunnar Hering, a historian whose work marked modern Greek history and historiography on Modern Greece and Southeastern Europe.[1] In particular, his work on the Ecumenical Patriarchate during the time of Cyril Lucaris[2] was a model for my own dissertation[3] as it was the only monograph that also took into consideration the political–diplomatic relations of the Great Powers with this religious institution. Although my

1 I am really grateful to the anonymous reviewer for the constructive comments I received as well as to Professor Maria Stassinopoulou and the Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of the University of Vienna for the great honor to call me as first speaker in the series of Gunnar Hering lectures. Professor Stassinopoulou significantly contributed to the improvement of the final version of my presentation. But mostly I would like to thank Professor Olga Katsiardi-Hering who accompanied me on this journey not only with her fruitful and supportive comments when I had delivered the lecture in April of 2016 but also with a continuous and reflective discussion on many crucial aspects of the Balkan and Late Ottoman History. I had also the opportunity to elaborate this presentation in the receptive settings of the Leibniz Institute of European History at Mainz as well as of the Program in Hellenic Studies at Princeton University which offered me hospitality once more for accomplishing my research project. I am thankful to the leaders of both. I have tried to retain the original character of a lecture in this essay, while at the same time providing a suitable text for the reader.

2 Gunnar Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik, 1620–1638*, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1968.

3 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, *Μεταρρύθμιση και Εκκοσμίκευση: προς μια ανασύνθεση της Ιστορίας του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου τον 19ο αιώνα* [*Reform and Secularization: Towards a Reconstruction of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th Century*], Athens: Alexandria Publications, 2003.

PhD aimed at highlighting the political competition between various interest groups inside the Patriarchate in the nineteenth century, the interpretative approach was based on the relationship between these groups mainly with foreign embassies—as Hering had suggested for the seventeenth century. Presenting the first lecture in this series was thus a double honor for me and I hope my essay will provide food for thought on issues that most certainly preoccupied him too.

Introduction

The last recapture of the Septinsular Republic by French troops after the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807 triggered a series of revolutionary actions in the Greek peninsula, just as had happened ten years before, in 1797.

As is well known, Ali Paşa, who had been appointed as Beylerbey of Rumeli in 1803, succeeded in 1807 in appointing his two sons, Muhtar Paşa and Veli Paşa respectively commanders at Trikala (Tirhala) in Thessaly and Tripoli (Tripoliçe) in the Peloponnese.[4] The total domination of Ali Paşa, along with the usual ensuing expropriation of large ownerships of his opponents and redeployment of armatolikia (αρματολίκια) in favor of factions controlled by him directly, caused reactions from the local elites.

[4] Dimitris Stamatopoulos, "Constantinople in the Peloponnese: The Case of the Dragoman of the Morea (Tercüman Bey) Georgios Wallerianos", in A. Anastasopoulos, E. Kolovos (eds.), *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760–1850,* Rethymnon: University of Crete 2007, pp. 149–164.

Indeed, in 1808 two rebellions took place in Thessaly and in the Peloponnese, which were activated by the French presence in the Ionian Islands, but which took ideological and political reference to the recently exploded Serbian Revolution, and had the political goal of overturning the hegemony of Ali Paşa in the Southern Balkan peninsula.

Before we go further, two great similarities between these rebellions with the Serbian one should be identified at this point. Firstly: neither of them sought to turn against Ottoman rule but against the "corrupt" management of Ali Paşa's sons. They were seeking to establish the Ottoman legitimacy and a balanced co-existence between the Christian and the Muslim population. Certainly this basic characteristic of the Serbian Revolution, that is the fact that it did not immediately emerge as nationalist but as restoring Ottoman legitimacy (something that Milos Obrenović would exploit politically in its second phase), could also be traced to the Romanian peasant uprising in Transylvania against the boyar landowners in the winter of 1784–85 under the leadership of the Romanian peasants Vasile Horea and Ioan Closça.[5]

[5] The peasant leader, Horea, would claim that he was acting in the name of Emperor Joseph—which, of course, was untrue. The revolutionary demands, as conveyed to the nobles by Carol Brüneck, were: "In the name of the aforementioned leader, known as Horea, and his simpleton followers, the demands are: 1. That the committee of nobles and all owners take an oath on the cross with all their offspring; 2. That there are no longer nobles and that anyone can find a good job from which to earn a livelihood; 3. That the noble-owners abandon their aristocratic holdings forever; 4. That they too pay taxes like all other taxed citizens; 5. That the fields of the nobles be shared among the ordinary people in accordance with the imperial decree that follows; 6. If His Excellency and the Honourable Council of Nobles with their noble landowners accept all the above, I pledge peace, in whose name

Secondly, as in the Serbian case where "the status in statu" autonomy of Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin was defining for the direction of the rebellion, so in the case of the rebellions in Thessaly and the Peloponnese the separatist mutinies of Ali Paşa of Ioannina played a decisive role. Of course, the outcome was different; Pazvantoğlu's involvement strengthened the revolutionary mutiny in the sancak of Belgrade,[6] while Ali Paşa's sons managed to suppress the revolts in the very core of Greek lands, quickly and efficiently.

But these similarities should not divert attention from the most crucial difference of the rebellion that took place in the Peloponnese. The cooperation and approach of Christian and Muslim notables, which took place under the French auspices, resulted in discussions that, according to some researchers, could have led to the writing of a code of laws between the two sides. Unfortunately, the text of this final agreement has not yet been

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I ask for white flags to be hoisted on high flagpoles and flown on the city's perimeter and at other ponts", *Obiective Programatice. Ultimatul Țăranilor* [Programmatic Objectives. Ultimatum to the Agrarians], 11 November 1784, in *1848 La Români o Istorie in Date și Mărturii* [*1848 among the Romanians: a History in Documents and Testimonies*], vol. I, Bucarest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică 1982, 4–5. Such intense class divisions did not exist in the Belgrade paşalık; nevertheless the invocation of the class differentiation was always an effective revolutionary method. It is perhaps worth adding that the same model of resurgence was followed also by Tudor Vladimirescu in January of 1821 when he proclaimed that the rebels turn against not the Sultan but the authoritarian regime of the Phanariotes and the Boyars; see E. D. Tappe, "The 1821 Revolution in the Romanian Principalities" in R. Clogg (ed.), *The Greek Struggle for Independence*, London: Macmillan 1973, pp. 134–55.

[6] Rossitsa Gradeva, "Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin: Between Old and New", *Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, XIII (2005) 115–161.

found, but it is certain that the two sides agreed to a joint-state option after the removal of Veli Paşa; a government equally represented by Muslims and Christians (twelve of each). However, this state partnership seems to have acquired an ideological background, since, according to the memoirs of Kolokotronis, the two sides agreed on a joint flag, which would depict the cross along with the crescent. According to Kolokotronis:

> Our flag would have the moon on the one side and the cross on the other [...].[7] If we would conquer the Peloponnese, we would give a report to the Sultan, saying that we had not rebelled against him, but against Veli Paşa – that was the plan.[8]

Still, the maximum goal that the revolutionaries-to-be had raised was autonomy from the Sublime Porte, based by the Serbian model, as mentioned above.

The two French occupations of the Ionian Islands, as well as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, prepared the way for the destabilization of Ottoman acquisitions in the Balkans and the eruption of two uprisings at the peninsula's opposite ends—at the northern border with the Habsburg dynasty and in the south, which had recently been occupied from the Venetians. The revolts did not begin as such but did end as national, and supposedly were influenced by representatives of the European Enlightenment. This quickly led scholars of Balkan history

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[7] It is not clear if Kolokotronis meant that the symbols would co-exist in a single representation, or be on different sides of the flag.

[8] Theodoros Kolokotronis, *Διήγησις Συμβάντων της Ελληνικής φυλής από το 1770 έως το 1836*, [Narration of the events of the Greek nation from 1770 to 1836], Athens: H. Nikolaidou Filadelfeos Publications 1846, 38.

to draw a link to the French Revolution[9] even though it was more likely the result of the Napoleonic Wars rather than the Revolution itself. And the question, therefore, is whether this interplay between the revolts in the Ottoman Balkans and what happened in Western Europe is limited to the influence of 1789 on the early nineteenth-century uprisings in Greece and Serbia, or whether the model can be extended to relate the development of other national movements to the great revolutionary events that took place in Paris during the remainder of the nineteenth century.

A wise man once observed that every capital city is identified with different things. Paris, for instance, is identified with revolutions. In a way, what is written here is nothing but an attempt to delve deeper into the mass emergence of revolutionary uprisings in the heart of continental Europe—even though this process was touched off by the Anglo-Saxon world and culminated with the Communist revolutions in Eurasia—as this occurred in Balkan regions which still, at the time, were in the embrace of the Ottoman and Austrian empires. The eruption of revolutions across Europe seemed to move in the opposite direction of how Hegel had imagined the flow of world history: instead of moving from East to West, with its spirit finally embodied by the Prussian state, it moved from West to East in the wake of Europe's rapid industrialization. Revolution seemed to herald the urbanization of the feudal societies and, one

[9] See for example, Paschalis Kitromilidis, *Η Γαλλική Επανάσταση και η Νοτιοανατολική Ευρώπη* [*The French Revolution and Southeastern Europe*], Athens: Diatton Publishing House, 1990, and Dušan T. Bataković, "Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Revolution in European Perspective", *Balkanica* XXXVI (2005), 114–128.

might say, this was a self-fulfilling prophecy even in the cases of Russian and Chinese revolutions, albeit with the creation of a massive bureaucracy. Nonetheless, France continued to alter the conditions giving shape to a modern bourgeois state.

Much ink has been spent explaining why Paris persists with revolutions. The likeliest reason, of course, is that the 1789 Revolution did not seal the political and social hegemony of the bourgeoisie as definitively as the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution in the seventeenth century in England did. And before this hegemony could be completed with the Paris revolutions of 1830 and 1848, an unforeseen element emerged on the world stage that forced an alliance of the bourgeoisie with the conservative landowners. But this was not the sole reason: revolution was also steeped in myth as 1789 became the founding moment of modernity. Efforts of the "reactionaries" to dispel this myth had the opposite effect of fanning it. Thus if 1789 marks the rise of civic society in Europe, then 1848 marks the moment the myth was appropriated by the proletariat. But then something interesting happened to European history: the same revolutionary event marked the divergence of the old industrialized nation-states of Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, labor movements fighting social inequality appeared to try to internally resolve the contradictions of urban society while somehow simultaneously reinforcing the social cohesion of aggressively colonial nations where the recession felt by the working classes was softened by the influx of wealth from the colonies. England was the example the others emulated. But in Central and Eastern Europe, Italian and German unification and the simmering crises

of the sprawling Ottoman, Habsburg, and post-Crimean War Romanov empires established 1848 as the springboard for a wave of national uprisings that also had a direct impact on the Balkans.

A century after the 1789 French Revolution, Paris experienced a new uprising. It would appear as if the Jacobins were exacting their revenge, yet what is most important is that this emerged from defeat abroad; if the French Revolution created the momentum for Napoleon to crush the Austrians and Prussians at Austerlitz and Jena, and if the English revolutions could take place after the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the security provided by the English Channel, then 1871 will create a new model of revolutionary process triggered by external intervention and military defeat. Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905 and by Germany in 1917, as well as China's defeat by Japan in 1937, replicate this model but on a much larger scale than 1871 Paris: the defeats in these larger cases created the dynamic for a revolution-driven internal restructuring of states that occupy entire continents.

We thus reach the following conclusion that is the springboard for this essay: that the end of the long nineteenth century will be the inverse of its beginning. The century began with a revolution that would trigger two decades of armed conflicts, and it ended with a Great War which, in turn, would set off a revolution that tries to complete the principles on which the French Revolution was founded, especially that of equality.

The three and one paradigms

But how can an examination of revolution related to war offer a new look or interpretation of Balkan history? To date we have seen two basic narratives for revolutionary events in the Balkans from the eighteenth through the twentieth century. One narrative is known as the "Eastern Question." It is the description of the colonial/imperial activity of the Great Powers rolling the dice on the fate of the ailing Ottoman Empire by fomenting nationalist movements, manipulating political elites, while striving to maintain the balance of power between them before embarking on a new war aimed at improving their position on the global chessboard. In the narrative of the "Eastern Question," the protagonist is the West (including in this case Russia and the Habsburg Empire). In reality, this historiographical paradigm corresponds with the classic Orientalist phase of Western colonialism, when the East, and specifically the Ottoman East, looms as an instrument of the superiority of a technologically, culturally, and militarily advanced "Rational West."[10] The exact correlation of the powerful

[10] Edouard Driault, *La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a nos jours*, Paris: Félix Alcan 1898, p. 2. It is impressive that until today the use of term has survived even in the work of writers who take its Orientalist origins into consideration, see for example the introduction in Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky, *Russian-Ottoman borderlands: The Eastern question reconsidered*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014. The "reconsideration" looks to be more a relegitimization of the concept than a critical transcendence of its past ideological uses. Another way to criticize the latter is to mention multiple Eastern Questions like Mark Mazower (*The Balkans: A Short History*, New York: The New Library 2000, 85–109) or Eliana Augusti

presence of the Great Powers in the eastern Mediterranean is the extensive crisis of the Ottoman Empire, "the Sick Man of Europe," who could not adapt to the spirit of the new times. A dinosaur of a bygone age that had to be extinguished.[11] We could notice that the term "Eastern Question" had dominated in the period since the end of the Crimean War to the outbreak of the Eastern Crisis. However, the classic definition of its content was given by Edward Driault at the end of the nineteenth century:

> La retraite de l'Islam en Europe et en Asie, de part et d'autre du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, donna naissance à la question d'Orient. Son histoire est proprement l'histoire des progrès des nations voisines en détriment des peuples musulmanes.

But this prevalent narrative was challenged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by a different one that came to dominate the post-WWI period: the history of the emergence of national movements. During the Ottoman (or Austrian) conquest, the Balkan peoples had

(*Questioni d'Oriente. Europa e Impero ottomano nel Diritto internazionale dell'Ottocento*, Napoli; Roma: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2013). However, the normalization of a narrative on unsuspecting Great Powers and irredentist Balkan National States could not explain the differentiation of the two different paradigms in the historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

[11] In one sense Frederick F. Anscombe, "The Balkan Revolutionary Age", *The Journal of Modern History,* 84:3, September 2012, pp. 572–606 reproduces the old paradigm's insistence of the failed endeavors of the Empire to reform itself. The reflective and contradictory results of the first reforms in the Ottoman Empire must not been neglected. On the contrary, they must be connected with corresponding developments in the West not for confirming the interventional role of the Great Powers but for tracing the influence of the internal splits of the West in the level of social transformation, and also in the level of colonial antagonism.

slipped into centuries of slumber. The French Revolution and the Enlightenment instigated their awakening and promoted them to claim what the West had already achieved: a state with a civil constitution which, above all, safeguarded property individual rights (something unheard of in the Ottoman East until 1858). Whereas in the first narrative the protagonists were the Great Western Powers and Russia, in this new narrative of "ethnocentric" historiography—using the term here broadly with regards to Balkan historiography, from Stavrianos[12] to Jelavić[13] on—the spotlight was taken by the states of the Balkan East, their resistance to the Ottoman conquest, their movements, their uprisings, their revolts, their state-, and nation-building. The Balkan national historiographies might be already constructed in the nineteenth century, but their re-contextualization in a new category of "Balkan nationalisms" realigned them with the new phase of Western colonialism. This pros-pect does not abandon the Orientalist nature of the "Eastern Question" paradigm but completes it with the Orientalist perspective of the peoples previously subjugated to Ottoman authority. And that explains the "co-existence" of the two paradigms at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries: the continuous retreat of the use of Eastern Question did not signify a pure split with the discourses on the Balkans. On the contrary, the latter emerged through the broken mirrors of the former.

If the use of the term "Eastern Question" dominated from the Crimean War to the Eastern Crisis, as noted

[12] Leften Stavros Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York: Rinehart, 1958.

[13] Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol.2, Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

above, a series of works which included the word "Balkans" in their title appeared especially at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century—probably the most important of all that of William Miller.[14] But it is extremely interesting that one of the first systematic narrations of the development of the Balkan national movements, the work of J. A. R. Marriot,[15] had been formulated in the interior of the "old" Eastern Question paradigm where actually his narrative on the diplomacy of the "Eastern Question" has been combined with that of the establishment of the Balkan nation-states. But something like this could have taken place only after the end of this process at the beginning of the twentieth century and especially after the end of the First World War. The Greek case is similar in that the first attempts of writing a kind of Balkan history were introduced by a Byzantinist, Konstantinos Amantos in his *Οι Βόρειοι γείτονες της Ελλάδας* [*The Northern Neighbors of Greece*], Athens, 1922, exactly after the end of the irredentist program of Megali Idea. On the other hand, the most complete Balkan diplomatic history of the twentieth century was also written by a former Byzantinist and specialist in Medieval Serbia, Michail Th. Laskaris, who occupied the position of the History of the Peoples of the Balkan Peninsula (the Mount Aimos Peninsula in the Greek denomination) at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki a year after Amantos became Professor of Byzantine History in Athens in 1926. But the title of his work was: *The Eastern Question (1800–1923)*, which was

[14] William Miller, *The Balkans. Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro,* New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1896.

[15] J. A. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question. An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918.

published in two issues in 1948 and 1955, when the paradigm of the Eastern Question had already collapsed. Amantos, following the line of Miller's work, would influence the intellectual quests of Leften Stavrianos, while at the same time Laskaris, the most solid Slavic Studies scholar of Greece in the inter- and post- war period, would be captive of an old nineteenth-century narration.

One of the basic characteristics of Balkan nationalisms was the effort to gain recognition from the West. In Balkan historiographies, this translates as an attempt to distance themselves from the negative semantic conno-tation of the East. The Ottoman past must not only be disavowed, but must also be shown as being responsible for the region's cultural, economic, and social development. But while the anti-colonial stance of national liberation movements outside Europe led to a critical approach of the Orientalist perspective, in the case of the Balkan national movements there was what we might call a positive stance towards Orientalist stereotypes which were only shaken after the end of the Cold War. Characteristically, publication of Franz Fanon's classic text *Les Damnés de la Terre* (1961) is separated by roughly 30–35 years from the works of three Balkan women—and this may not be accidental—who for the first time questioned the issue of the Orientalist invention of the meaning of the Balkans: Skopetea,[16] Todorova,[17] and Bakić-Heyden.[18]

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[16] Elli Skopetea, *Η δύση της Ανατολής: εικόνες από το τέλος της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας* [*Orient's West/: Images of the End of the Ottoman Empire*], Athens: Gnosi, 1992.

[17] Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 [[1]1997].

[18] Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia", *Slavic Review* 54, Winter 1995, p. 917–31.

These two historiographical examples, which emerged during different phases of Western colonialism—the former during its waxing, the latter during its waning, the former during its classical period, the latter during what we might call the neo-colonialism period—can be synchronized in their acceptance of the model of the Ottoman Empire's decline. The prerequisite for the rise of national movements became the extended crisis of the Ottoman state from the seventeenth century forward—what Halil Inalcik, the famous Turkish historian, called "decline of the Ottoman classical age."

In the wake of the Cold War's end, a new historiographical paradigm appears to take shape. Let us call it the "Empire's paradigm": it did not highlight just the imperial Ottoman past, but also a tendency to rewrite European history not only as a history of the shaping of national states but as two zones of imperial states—colonial and continental. Balkan history was significantly renewed through this perspective, because rather than being interpreted as a fixed cultural and historical entity, it was approached as a border; not as a border between West and East, as suggested by the Eastern Question paradigm, but as the border where the three great continental empires of eastern Europe—the Ottoman, the Habsburg, and the Russian—met and clashed.

The imperial past was linked to the value system of a multicultural society such as the one that showed strong signs of emerging from the collapse of state socialism. Specifically, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the "peaceful" coexistence of peoples who would later clash violently in order to share its garments would seem like the discovery of a world erased by the era of nationalisms.

However, such an approach has evident limitations in the sense that it often leads to an idealization of aspects of the Ottoman Empire and the orientalist-inspired denouncement of the bad nationalisms that dismantled it (Arnold Toynbee's "The Western Question" could be characterized as an ancestor of this new kind of orientalist discourse).

Naturally, such an analysis would insist not only on a critical handling of the Balkan national discourses and thus the corresponding national movements (the historiographical example of Balkan nationalisms), but also on disputing the model of decline (the historiographical paradigm of the Eastern Question). Indeed, a series of prominent Ottomanists, starting with Suraiya Faroqhi, raised the issue of the interpretation of the Ottoman Empire as an early modern state and thus not so different from those that emerged in Western Europe during the early Ottoman centuries. Even though such an approach remains to be elaborated, given that the Ottoman Empire's rivals accelerated at such a rate that it could not follow them, it broadened the horizons of historical research mainly because, for the first time, and even if indirectly, they tried to compare the empire as well as the entire Ottoman Balkan world with what we schematically call "the West."[19]

[19] In the same way, the Confessionalization paradigm as reformulated in the Ottoman imperial context could be also fruitful, historicizing the role of the religion in the emerging of the millet system during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, although the influence of the interreligious connections with the West (especially during the period of the Religious Wars or the age of Tanzimar reforms) must be pointed out, the approach of confessionalization should be connected with the topic of the power networks constructed inside and outside of the Empire. See among others Tijana Krstić, "Illuminated by the

This analysis allows an interpretation that correctly aims to highlight the historical value of the Ottoman past: to see the emergence of national movements in the Balkans, and by extension the uprisings that aspired to revolution, as neither autonomous awakenings nor as the result of Great Power competition in the eastern Mediterranean[20] but as corresponding to the revolutionary process that marked the history of the West. The nationalist movements in eastern and southeastern Europe, an area extending from Poland to Greece, continuously negotiate their identities according to the West's internal fragmentations. More specifically, we could describe the Balkan national movements from their inception as the ripple effect from the revolutions in the West, especially those taking place in Paris.

Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ottoman Sultanate—Self-Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalization", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:1, 2009, pp. 35–63, Nathalie Clayer, "The dimension of confessionalisation in the Ottoman Balkans at the time of Nationalisms", in H. Grandits, N. Clayer and R. Pichler, *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans. The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire, and Nation-Building*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, pp. 89–109.

[20] An early attempt to solve this problem could be traced in the work of Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. For them the roots of the revolutionary tradition in the Balkans should be traced from the moment of the resistance against the Ottoman invasion in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, although they distinguished the "modern" (merchant- and scholar-dominated) from the premodern movements through a classical sociological perspective.

The three and one waves of Balkan nationalism(s)

The essential difference between a revolt and a revolution, except for the existence of a new political horizon which characterizes the latter, is that it can actually only be traced a posteriori.[21] On the other hand, a national movement, although it is signified by processual character, has usually been marked by its revolutionary moment. In this sense, we could separate the Balkan movements into three large categories, according to when they peaked and not necessarily by their supposed beginning or their outcomes. Such a criterion might seem problematic, but it solves two significant problems in the history of the nationalisms of eastern and southeastern Europe. First, it allows us to understand the circumstances under which these uprisings restructured their national past, in other words the way in which they constructed the national symbols that comprised their stereotypes and which mainly created the forms of continuity through national historiographies. And second, we can better understand the way they proposed their establishment as autonomous or independent political entities.

Nevertheless, these three phases of national movements' emergence concern mainly the nineteenth century and should be supplemented with one more definitive moment: the appearance of revolutionary movements in the heart of two important continental empires—the Russian Empire (1905) and the Ottoman Empire (1908).

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[21] Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492–1992*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.